This document introduces EntireX Security under z/OS through overviews of the functionality and components of EntireX Security. The location where Broker Kernel is installed determines the functionality made available for EntireX Security. This document covers the following topics:
Installation of the security software is described under Installing EntireX Security under z/OS.
This table lists the security functionality available with EntireX Security running Broker Kernel under the respective operating system. See also Configuration Options for Broker.
|Authentication of user||Yes||Yes||Yes||Yes||Yes||Verify User ID password.|
|User password change||Yes||No||No||No||No|
|LDAP authentication||No||Yes||Yes||No||No||Authenticate using LDAP repository.|
|Trusted user ID||Yes||No||No||No||No||Trusted computer base, avoiding plain text password.|
|Verified client user ID||Yes||No||No||Yes||Yes||Provide verified identity of client to server.|
|Authorization of client request||Yes||No||No||No||No|
|Authorization of server register||Yes||No||No||No||No|
|Authorize IP connection||Yes||No||No||No||No|
|Authorization rules||No||Yes||Yes||No||No||Check rules stored in an LDAP repository. These
rules are maintained using an agent of System Management Hub, and are
independent of the LDAP authentication mechanism.
|Encryption of application data||Yes||Yes||Yes||No||Yes||RC4-compatible algorithm.|
|Guaranteed encryption||Yes||Yes||Yes||No||Yes||Allows administrator to require encryption for specific services.|
|SSL||Yes||Yes||Yes||No||No||Industry standard encryption mechanism.|
This diagram depicts the location where the Broker kernel must be installed and where the Broker stubs can be installed. It also depicts the location of the security components of the kernel and stubs of Broker.
This section presents EntireX Security for EntireX Broker under the z/OS operating system covers the following topics:
See also Security-specific Attributes under Broker Attributes and Operator Commands.
EntireX Broker acts as an agent to make the creation and operation of client/server applications simpler and more effective. Any number of server applications can be built for use by any number of clients. EntireX Security allows you to protect your server applications and clients independently.
Clients and servers are authenticated by user ID and password on their first contact with the system. Authorization is sought for specific server applications before a client is allowed access. This enables control of your distributed application systems - at both the application level and the client level.
Authorization is also required for server applications to register services. Unauthorized servers can be intercepted when trying to register. Facilities exist to establish connection authorization when client and server applications first establish contact with the Broker.
Application components running in a mainframe environment that communicate using EntireX Broker interact with EntireX Security in the following ways:
No password is required for applications executing under mainframe where the trusted user ID option is implemented. This is true for both client and server application components. EntireX Security automatically acquires the logged-on user ID. Utilizing the "trusted" user ID avoids having to supply the password again. It also requires customers to configure security for their mainframe environment(s), for example ensuring that the CICS system is protected by RACF.
Applications can override the trusted user ID by supplying a valid user
ID/password combination in the ACI control block. This causes EntireX Security
to ignore the trusted user ID in favor of the supplied credentials.
Applications must therefore ensure that they do not assign an incorrect user ID
or spurious password to the ACI control block, where "trusted"
user ID is implemented. The
CLIENT-ID as conveyed in the ACI to the server
component of the application now represents the client's verified user ID,
derived either from valid user ID/password credentials or from trusted user ID
This section describes the parameters for configuring EntireX Security
under z/OS. You may either accept or modify the default settings which are
specified in the Broker attribute file
DEFAULTS=SECURITY. Always check
installation options against the corresponding resource profile.
See Resource Profiles in EntireX Security.
This section covers the following topics:
Authentication is mandatory and performed for both client and server applications based on user ID and password. First contact with the Broker results in the host security system being referenced. If authentication fails, access is denied and the application is informed with a suitable error message.
It is the responsibility of both client and server applications to supply a valid user ID and password when calling the Broker. The user ID must be supplied with all commands. The password is required only for the first command and should not be supplied subsequently, except when executing multiple instances of the same application.
Authentication expires after a period of non-activity after which it
must be repeated. User ID and password must be resupplied before further
access is possible. The time limits
determine these timeout periods and are defined in the Broker attribute file.
Applications must not assign a password to the ACI control block if they intend to use trusted user ID. This applies to all applications, including EntireX RPC Server.
This allows z/OS-based applications to communicate securely without having
to supply user ID and password. Activate this option by specifying the
following parameter in job member
||Require user ID/password for z/OS application components.|
||Leverage trusted user ID mechanism for z/OS applications.|
Make sure the Adabas Security Interface is enabled by specifying the following parameter in the source assembled by job member
||Adabas Security Interface in use.|
Clients request distributed processing using the
indicating the class, name and service to be invoked. The Broker
transmits the request to the server only if the client has access to the
relevant resource profile. Similarly, servers are allowed to
services only if the server has access to the resource profile. The
default profile make-up comprises class.name.service of the service. The
following system parameters will modify the resource profile if
||Include Class in resource check.|
||Include Name in resource check.|
||Include Service in resource check.|
At least one option must be "YES" for authorization to be performed.
For example: if
INCLUDE-SERVICE=YES, the structure of the
resource profile checked is:
INCLUDE-SERVICE=YES, the profile would look
INCLUDE-SERVICE=YES, the resource profile to be
READ access to obtain
processing from a server application and servers require
CONTROL access in order to
REGISTER successfully, otherwise the command
Authorization checks are also performed for publish-and-subscribe processing.
Subscribers are allowed to
SUBSCRIBE only if they have
access to the resource profile representing the
TOPIC to which they are subscribing.
A publisher requires
CONTROL access in order to successfully
PULBLISH to a topic.
Discrete or generic resource profiles can be defined for this purpose.
If you set
the Broker ID is used as a prefix for all authorization checks.
If you are using one of the following RPC servers with a broker protected by, for example, RACF or CA Top Secret,
at least READ access is required to resources
CICS ECI RPC Server
IMS Connect RPC Server
Micro Focus RPC Server
WebSphere MQ RPC Server
Java RPC Server
XML/SOAP RPC Server
A security token is generated by EntireX. It is the responsibility of the application to clear the security token before making the first call and thereafter to maintain the contents of the field for the duration of communication for the user.
If validation of security token is not required - for example, where applications or packages do not maintain the security token in the ACI control block - this option may be switched off. The default setting is "NO" (do not ignore Security Token).
||Do not ignore Security Token.|
EntireX Security ensures message encryption consistency regardless of any configuration errors. This means, if the relevant assembly parameters or environment variables are incorrectly or inconsistently specified, the integrity of the Broker message is honored. This feature requires upgrade of all EntireX Security Broker stub and kernel components in all places.
See Broker attribute
and control block field
Communication between distributed application components and the Broker via TCP/IP can be subject to an authorization check at connection time. Define the following system parameter if this option is required:
||Authorize IP connection.|
The normal mode of operation is to prevent access to resources not defined to the security system. Profiles representing services are added to the security repository with either a default access or by granting access to specific users and groups. Access to undefined resources can be permitted using the following system parameter:
||Allow access to undefined resources.|
This option does not permit access to resources defined with universal access "none". See also note on defining resources to ACF.
By default, the resource class/type
NBKSAG is used when performing
authorization checks. The name of an alternate resource class can be specified
using the following system parameter:
||Resource class for Broker.|
By default, the maximum length of the resource class/type profiles is 80 characters when performing authorization checks. Longer resource profiles can be checked by increasing the maximum resource profile length as follows. Make sure you also increase the maximum profile length in the SAF Class/Type Descriptor table in z/OS.
||Max resource profile length.|
To cater for situations where a site is in transition from uppercase to mixed case passwords setting this parameter can convert all passwords to uppercase. It is not recommended you use this option by default.
||Convert password to uppercase.|
By default, EntireX Security furnishes authentication with optional encryption of send/receive buffers. The following parameter can be used to modify the functionality of EntireX Security:
||No authentication or authorization checks performed. The only functionality available in this mode is message privacy.|
||User authentication is performed but without any resource authorization (the normal default operation).|
||User authentication and resource authorization are both applied.|
In version 8.0, the default value for this parameter was "AUTHORIZATION"
It is often important for server applications to know the identity of the
client issuing the request. For this reason, the Broker kernel communicates the
CLIENT-UID to the server application during the
EntireX Security guarantees that the
CLIENT-UID has been formally
authenticated. EntireX Security automatically substitutes the value from
trusted user ID where this is applicable.
||Set ACI field
||Do not set this value unless explicitly instructed to do so by Software AG support.|
This parameter can be used to specify a prefix which is added to all authorization checks, hence enabling broker kernels in different environments to perform authorization checks on different sets of resource profiles. For example, it is often important to distinguish among production, test, and development environments when performing authorization checks. The following settings are available:
||This causes the Broker ID - i.e., ETB113 - to be used as a prefix for all authorization checks.|
||This will utilize the string "node_name" (maximum 8 characters) as the prefix for all authorization checks.|
||This causes the actual text (max 8 characters) to be prefixed onto all authorization checks..|
For services supporting Natural RPC or other applications that know RPC,
you can optionally perform authorization checks on the client making the RPC
request by defining the "per service" attribute
in the Broker attribute file. Setting this parameter to "YES" will
cause the RPC library and program names to be appended to the profile
associated with the authorization check. The resource profile would then appear
Natural Security performs its resource authorization checks as follows:
To allow conformity with Natural Security, the
can optionally be defined with a prefix character as follows:
Application components running in a mainframe Natural environment which communicate using EntireX Broker interact with EntireX Security in the following ways:
No password is required for applications executing under mainframe Natural where the trusted user ID option is implemented. This is true for both client and server application components. EntireX Security automatically acquires the logged-on user ID. Utilizing the trusted user ID avoids having to supply the password again. It also requires the customers to configure security for their mainframe environment(s), for example,ensuring that the CICS system is protected by RACF.
Applications can override the trusted user ID by supplying a valid
user ID/password combination in the ACI control block.
This causes EntireX Security to ignore the trusted user ID in favor of the supplied credentials.
Applications must therefore ensure that they do not assign an incorrect user ID
or spurious password to the ACI control block, where trusted user ID is
CLIENT-ID as conveyed in the
ACI to the server component of the application now represents the client's
verified user ID, derived either from valid user ID/password credentials or
from trusted user ID itself.
This section describes the definitions required in the SAF repository according to the underlying security system used (RACF, CA ACF2, CA Top Secret). It covers the following topics:
EntireX Security enables the secure deployment of EntireX Broker. This involves defining the resource profiles in the SAF repository to protect all distributed and mainframe application components. This philosophy is consistent with maintaining a single user ID and password.
Each SAF security system provides the facilities required for maintaining resource profiles.
RACF enables the grouping of similar resource profiles into a resource Class. CA ACF2 provides resource types which give equivalent functionality.
The name of the SAF class/type used to hold the EntireX-related resource
profiles is specified with the Security-specific attribute
The default length of the resource profile is 80 bytes, and this can be
increased if necessary. See
If you increase the maximum profile length, you must also increase the maximum
profile length defined in the RACF class descriptor table.
This section describes the format of various resource profiles. Note that the specific contents of resource files themselves will vary, depending upon the configuration options specified in the Security-specific Attributes under Broker Attributes.
Client Server Example
Resource profiles protecting Broker client and server applications normally comprise Broker class, name and service. It is possible to omit any of these components from the resource profile. See also Request Authorization. The following resource profile shows an example service:
Client applications must execute with a user ID that has READ access to allow them to send to the given service. Registration of services is also secured. Server applications require CONTROL access to register a service with the Broker.
Publis and Subscribe Example
Resource profiles protecting Broker publish and subscribe applications are always defined in terms of the 96 character topic name. The following resource profile would be used to protect a topic used for publish and subscribe:
Subscriber applications must execute with a user ID that has READ access to this resource to allow them to issue the subscribe command for this topic. Publisher applications require CONTROL access in order to send publications to the topic.
If optional TCP/IP address checking is required at authentication time, the relevant resource profiles must be defined in the security system. Users will require READ access in order to connect, using TCP/IP, from a particular address. A typical TCP/IP address would be entered in the security system as follows:
You can perform TCP/IP address checking independently of user authentication and authorization, by setting
SECURITY-LEVEL=ENCRYPTION, i.e. not
authentication or authorization. This results in an authorization check for the
IP address for the user ID under which EntireX Broker itself executes.
Access to Command and Information Services is controlled by permitting, or denying, access to Software AG supplied services which implement Command and Information Services.
For a complete list of profiles representing these services, see Authorization for Command and Information Services.
For more information see Security with Command and Information Services.
This section describes the definitions required in the various supported security systems in order to enable Security for EntireX resources. These definitions are described in the following subsections:
Define resources using uppercase characters only.
This section defines how the EntireX resources are defined to RACF. For exact details of the procedures to be followed for the installed RACF version, consult the relevant IBM manuals.
Overview of tasks:
Add classes to class descriptor table
Update z/OS router table
Activate new classes
Assign user ID for the Broker started task, if you have not done so already
Permit user access to resource profiles
Optimize the performance of RAC authorization checks
To add classes to class descriptor table
Add the resource classes to the RACF class descriptor table. Refer to the IBM SPL RACF manual.
For an example, see IBM
You must allocate a class descriptor length for class NBKSAG of 80 bytes in order to prevent the possibility of a system 282 abend, which could occur if the length of your resource (class/server/service) exceeds the length known to RACF. The maximum length allowed by EntireX is 80 bytes, so allow 80 bytes in the RACF class descriptor table.
Define the classes to enable discrete and generic profile use.
Check further attributes controlling the level of RACF messages
generated when performing
RACROUTE calls, as well as the required level of SMF
recording. Sample definitions are provided in source member
To update z/OS router table
Update the z/OS router table as described in the IBM SPL RACF
manual. For an example, see the IBM
To activate new classes
Activate new resource classes with
SETROPTS (see IBM RACF
Command Language Reference manual). For an example, activate class
SETROPTS CLASSACT(NBKSAG) SETROPTS GENCMD(NBKSAG) SETROPTS GENERIC(NBKSAG)
To assign user ID for the Broker started task
The EntireX Security functions are performed within the address
space of EntireX Broker.
Assign a user ID to the Broker started task with the relevant RACF
authorizations, including the ability to perform
TYPE=VERIFY calls on profiles belonging to the defined
To permit user access to resource profiles
After adding profiles to protect the different resources, permits
users the required level of access, using the relevant RACF commands. The
following example adds resource profile
ETB.POLICY.QUOTE1 and grants read
access to user ID USER2 and control access to USER3. USER2 represents a client
and requires read access to execute while USER3 represents a server component
which needs control access to register:
RDEFINE NBKSAG ETB.POLICY.QUOTE1 UACC(NONE) PERMIT ETB.POLICY.QUOTE1 CLASS(NBKSAG) ACCESS(READ) ID(USER2) PERMIT ETB.POLICY.QUOTE1 CLASS(NBKSAG) ACCESS(CONTROL) ID(USER3)
If you utilize authorization checks based upon TCP/IP address (TCP
transport only) then define these resource definitions (
RDEFINE) as follows and
PERMIT the appropriate user read access as shown:
RDEFINE NBKSAG 247.72.46.239 UACC(NONE) PERMIT 247.72.46.239 CLASS(NBKSAG) ACCESS(READ) ID(USER42)
To optimize the performance of RACF authorization checks
SETROPTS RACLIST(NBKSAG) to cache in memory the RACF general resource profiles belonging to
NBKSAG. If you use a RACF resource class other than
NBKSAG, make sure this RACF general resource
class is cached in memory.
This section defines how the EntireX classes are defined to CA Top Secret. For exact details of the procedures to be followed for the installed version of CA Top Secret, consult the relevant CA Top Secret manual.
Overview of tasks:
Add CA Top Secret Facility
Assign user ID for the Broker started task, if you have not done so already
Add procedure name for the started task
Add resource type to resource definition table
Assign ownership of resources
Permit defined resources to users
To add CA Top Secret Facility
CA Top Secret enables a set of authorization checks to be made
against a certain facility. For example, this can be used to secure the
SAGDEV separately from the production environment
SAGPROD. Alternatively, a default facility of batch can be used.
To add additional facilities, use the following commands:
To assign a user ID for the Broker started task
Add one user ID for each instance of the Broker started task.
If required, different facilities can be assigned to development and production started tasks.
The designated facility is assigned to the started task user ID:
TSS CRE(user-id) DEPT(dept) MASTFAC(fac)
To add a procedure name for the Broker started task
The procedure name under which the Broker started task executes must be defined to CA Top Secret.
TSS ADD(STC) PROC(proc) ACID(user-id)
To add resource type to resource definition table
Add the resource types to the CA Top Secret resource definition
table (RDT). Resource definitions relating to EntireX are kept in resource type
NBKSAG. Refer to the CA Top Secret Reference Guide for a
detailed explanation of the following commands and arguments:
TSS ADD(RDT) RESCLASS(NBKSAG) RESCODE(HEXCODE) ATTR(LONG) ACLST(NONE,READ,CONTROL) DEFACC(NONE)
To assign ownership of resources
Assign ownership to a particular resource as shown in the following example. This must be done before permitting access to defined resource profiles:
TSS ADD(user1) NBKSAG(etb.policy.quote1)
This makes user user1 the owner of the Broker service etb.policy.quote1.
Similarly, to add ownership to profiles used to control access based on TCP/IP address (TCP communications only) follow the steps below. This makes user4 the owner of this resource profile:
TSS ADD(user4) NBKSAG(247.72.46.239)
To permit defined resource to users
Permit access to a resource profile as in the following example. In the example, user user2 is permitted read access to the Broker service etb.policy.quote1. This enables the user to execute as a client and issue requests to this Broker service:
TSS PER(user2) NBKSAG(etb.policy.quote1) FAC(fac) ACCESS(READ)
Similarly, to permit access to profiles used to control access based
on TCP/IP address, use the
PER command as shown:
TSS PER(user42) NBKSAG(247.72.46.239) FAC(fac) ACCESS(READ)
See also your CA ACF2 documentation.
CA ACF2 provides insufficient return codes to determine whether a resource profile does not exist or simply the user does not have access to it. Therefore, if access is denied by CA ACF2, EntireX Security will always report "Access denied resource not allowed" in the error message.
To define resources to CA ACF2
The Broker or Broker Services started task executes as a normal started task in z/OS. Define the user ID of started task to CA ACF2 with the following attributes:
Insert SAFDEF records as follows:
SAFDEF.EXS1 FUNCRET(4) FUNCRSN(0) ID(ENTIREX) MODE(GLOBAL) RACROUTE(REQUEST=VERIFY SUBSYS=ETBNUC REQSTOR=-) RETCODE(4) SAFDEF.EXS2 FUNCRET(4) FUNCRSN(0) ID(ENTIREX) MODE(GLOBAL) RACROUTE(REQUEST=AUTH SUBSYS=ETBNUC REQSTOR=-) RETCODE(4) SAFDEF.EXS3 FUNCRET(4) FUNCRSN(0) ID(ENTIREX) MODE(GLOBAL) RACROUTE(REQUEST=EXTRACT SUBSYS=ETBNUC REQSTOR=-) RETCODE(4)
For the general resource class name used by EntireX Security, define
a 3-character CA ACF2 resource type code by inserting a
CLASMAP record as
CLASMAP ENTITYLN(0) MUSID() RESOURCE(NBKSAG) RSRCTYPE(NBK)
Define the required security profiles to CA ACF2 using the new type code.
The following example shows the addition of a Broker service etb.policy.quote1, allowing read access only for user ID user2:
$KEY(ETB) TYPE(NBK) policy.quote1 UID(user2) SERVICE(READ) ALLOW policy.quote1 UID(-) PREVENT
A service level of DELETE is required for a service to register (this is functionally the same as CONTROL access in RACF).
The following example secures the TCP/IP connection for checking at authentication time for the TCP/IP address of 247.72.46.239 granting access to all users, except U402451.
$KEY(247) TYPE(NBK) 72.46.239 UID(user42) SERVICE(READ) ALLOW 72.46.239 UID(u402451) SERVICE(READ) ALLOW